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A B S T R A C T
Despite widespread use in clinical and experimental contexts, debate continues over whether or not the
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) successfully measures sustained attention. Altering physical as-
pects of the response movement required to SART stimuli may help identify whether performance is a better
measure of perceptual decoupling, or response strategies and motor inhibition. Participants completed a SART
where they had to manually move a mouse cursor to respond to stimuli, and another SART where this extra
movement was not required, as in a typical SART. Additionally, stimuli were located at either a close or a far
distance away. Commission errors were inversely related to distance in the manual movement condition, as the
farther distance led to longer response times which gave participants more time to inhibit prepotent responses
and thus prevent commission errors. Self-reported measures of mental demand and fatigue suggested there were
no diﬀerences in mental demands between the manual and automatic condition; instead the diﬀerences were
primarily in physical demands. No diﬀerences were found for task-unrelated thoughts between the manual and
automatic condition. The movement eﬀect combined with participants' subjective reports are evidence for time
dependent action stopping, not greater cognitive engagement. These ﬁndings support a response strategy per-
spective as opposed to a perceptual decoupling perspective, and have implications for authors considering using
the SART. Applied implications of this research are also discussed.
1. Introduction
The Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson, Manly,
Andrade, Baddeley, and Yiend, 1997) is a Go/No-Go response task used
for measuring sustained attention deﬁcits due to, for example, trau-
matic brain injury (TBI; Chan, 2001; Dockree et al., 2004; Manly et al.,
2004; O'Keeﬀe, Dockree, and Robertson, 2004; Robertson et al., 1997),
ADHD (Bellgrove, Hawi, Gill, and Robertson, 2006; Johnson et al.,
2007; Manly et al., 2001; Mullins, Bellgrove, Gill, and Robertson,
2005), depression (Smallwood, O'Connor, Sudbery, and Obonsawin,
2007), and mind-wandering (Christoﬀ, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, and
Schooler, 2009). In the SART, participants respond to frequent ‘Go’
stimuli and withhold responses to infrequent ‘No-Go’ stimuli. The pri-
mary measures of interest on the SART are errors of commission (failing
to withhold to No-Go stimuli), errors of omission (failing to respond to
Go stimuli) and response times (RTs) to Go stimuli. In the SART,
commission errors and speeded RTs to Go stimuli are considered by
many researchers as markers or indicators of lapsing attention. Other
researchers dispute the idea that commission errors in the SART are
necessarily due to attention lapses and instead note the role of response
strategy in the task. The SART is characterized by a speed–accuracy
trade-oﬀ (Head and Helton, 2014a; Helton, 2009; Helton, Kern, and
Walker, 2009; Peebles and Bothell, 2004; Robertson et al., 1997). The
high Go, low No-Go nature of the task leads to a high rate of re-
sponding; most stimuli are Go stimuli. When the infrequent No-Go
stimuli do occur, they interrupt the ﬂow of frequent Go stimuli and
participants are often physically unable to withhold their response, and
thus make an error of commission due to their emphasis on speed.
When Head and Helton (2014b) tested participants over multiple ses-
sions they found that participants' oscillated between emphasizing
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speed and accuracy, providing further support for the role of response
strategy.
The role of motor response inhibition in the SART has been well-
established (Helton, 2009; Seli, Cheyne, and Smilek, 2012) and the
creators of the SART have acknowledged the central role of the spee-
d–accuracy trade-oﬀ in SART performance (Robertson et al., 1997).
However, many authors seem to deemphasize the role of motor in-
hibition processes. Instead these authors propose that participants in
the SART become disengaged from the task, or perceptually decoupled,
due to the monotonous nature of the SART stimuli and the task itself.
Subjects are from this perspective lulled into an automatic pattern of
responding which requires little eﬀort to maintain. Thus, participants
speed up their responses when they stop paying attention to the task.
Because the participants disengage attention to the task they fail to
withhold responses to the No-Go stimuli. This idea of perceptual de-
coupling of attention from the task is the result of mindlessness (Manly,
Robertson, Galloway, and Hawkins, 1999; Robertson et al., 1997) or
mind-wandering (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006).
An alternative perspective is that commission errors in the SART are
not a reﬂection of mind-wandering, mindlessness, or losses of sustained
attention, but rather the result of choice of response strategy. Peebles
and Bothell (2004) presented, for example, an Adaptive Control of
Thought-Rational (ACT-R; Anderson and Lebiere, 1998) model which
can predict the association between RTs to Go stimuli and commission
errors in participants' SART performance. Their model incorporates two
competing response strategies, one being encode and ‘click’ (re-
spond)—which favours response speed over accuracy—and the other
being encode and ‘check’—which favours accuracy over response
speed. The choice of response strategy is dynamic, in that a participant
may alternate between strategies depending on which is perceived to be
the most eﬀective at any one time. Perceptions of eﬀectiveness are
partly based on the participant's history of successes and failures with
each strategy over the task. In a high Go, low No-Go task such as the
SART, it may make sense to prioritise speed over the ability to withhold
responses. In the SART, 89% of trials are Go trials, and so a participant
responding more quickly stands to gain a performance beneﬁt of speed
89% of the time. However, they are less likely to be able to withhold the
Go response when No-Go stimuli occur (only 11% of the time). This
appears to be due to the development of a ballistic feed-forward motor
program (Head, Russell, Dorahy, Neumann, and Helton, 2012; Helton
et al., 2005). The SART is highly conducive to the development of this
motor program, because of the high probability that a trial will require
a response (Ramautar, Kok, and Ridderinkhof, 2004) as well as the
constant quick pressing which is required of subjects (Doyon, Penhune,
and Ungerleider, 2003). Motor programs can be beneﬁcial in that they
may make a highly-used response more eﬃcient (e.g., faster and re-
quiring less eﬀort) but in the case of the SART they lead to a high rate of
commission errors.
It is plausible that the two diﬀering perspectives are not mutually
exclusive. However, when evidence of subjects' thoughts during the
SART is considered, the validity of the perceptual decoupling argument
appears even less likely. Participants often report increases in tense
arousal from before the task to after the task, indicating the task is itself
stressful (e.g. Head and Helton, 2012). Furthermore, participants often
report increases in task-related thoughts (TRTs) and decreases in task-
unrelated thoughts (TUTs; Wilson, Russell, & Helton, 2015). Moreover,
there are many anecdotal reports of participants afterwards describing
how diﬃcult it was to withhold to No-Go stimuli, and how their hand
seemed to develop a mind of its own, known as alienation of agency
(Cheyne, Carriere, and Smilek, 2009). Participants are aware of their
commission errors 99.1% of the time (McAvinue, O'Keefe, McMackin,
and Robertson, 2005). Performance on the SART does not appear to be
associated with mindlessness, mind-wandering, or lack of attention to
the stimuli. That said, SART performance may index another form of
attention, that is, internally directed attention. It is plausible that par-
ticipants must attend to their own response strategy in order to regulate
it and manage the constant trade-oﬀ between speed and accuracy
throughout the task. This form of attention is probably controlled by the
supervisory attention system (Norman and Shallice, 1986). An intern-
ally directed form of attention is not the same as externally directed
attention (i.e., attention as it is usually considered) however.
SART performance is inﬂuenced by a number of factors which
support a response strategy explanation of SART performance. Altering
the task instructions, to emphasize accuracy over speed, leads partici-
pants to slow their speed of responding and to make fewer commission
errors (Seli et al., 2012). Thus, the tendency to use the “encode and
click” or “encode and check” strategies is inﬂuenced by top-down ex-
ecutive control or explicit strategy choice. This supports the idea that
SART performance is driven mostly by response strategy, as does the
ﬁnding that providing warning cues to indicate the arrival of No-Go
stimuli in the SART helps to prevent commission errors and mitigates
the speed–accuracy trade-oﬀ (Finkbeiner, Wilson, Russell, and Helton,
2015; Helton, Head, and Russell, 2011). These warning cues facilitate
performance only when they reliably precede a No-go stimulus where
they provide the time necessary to inhibit the Go response; there is no
incentive to choose an encode and click strategy. Introducing an arti-
ﬁcial delay to RT can also decrease commission errors, as shown by Seli,
Jonker, Cheyne, and Smilek (2013), who had participants wait for a
slightly delayed audible cue before they could make a response fol-
lowing stimuli presentation. A longer response window means there is
no advantage of the simple encode and click strategy; there is time to
check the stimuli.
Altering the response format, by increasing the time that is required
to physically make a response, has also been shown to reduce com-
mission errors. Head and Helton (2013, 2014b) required participants to
physically move a mouse cursor towards a target to select it before they
were able to perform a typical button-press response. Making the
physical response more elaborate and slower resulted in longer RTs,
which appeared to allow participants time to inhibit the prepotent
motor response and consequently to make fewer commission errors.
Whether this result is in fact due to participants having more time to
prevent prepotent motor responses is uncertain however. Perhaps the
physical component of the additional manual movement simply leads to
fewer oﬀ-task thoughts or mind-wandering, relative to a typical SART,
as might be suggested by proponents of the perceptual decoupling
perspective. Additionally, the physical component may not only induce
additional physical demand, but extra mental demand as well. Ac-
cording to the perceptual or externally-directed sustained attention
explanation, commission errors are the result of boredom or “under-
load,” or in other words, not enough mental demand (Robertson et al.,
1997). The added physical component could serve to increase exo-
genous support for the task by grabbing participants' attention (Johnson
et al., 2007), which, according to this perspective, could lead to a lower
rate of commission errors.
The current experiment, like that of Head and Helton (2013), ma-
nipulated both the movement required to make responses to stimuli, as
well as the stimuli location. Concerning stimuli acquisition, in one
condition—‘manual selection’—following the appearance of a Go sti-
mulus participants were required to physically move a mouse cursor to
a box containing the stimulus before they could then press the mouse
button to make a click response, once the cursor was inside the box. In
the other condition—‘automatic selection’—no movement of the mouse
cursor was required. Instead participants had to simply press the mouse
button when a Go stimulus appeared in a box. This is more similar to
the response format in a typical SART. The second manipulation con-
cerned the location of stimuli. Stimuli locations were arranged to the
left and right of the screen center at near and far distances. This enabled
the measurement of the eﬀects of target distance (near vs. far) on
commission errors and RT.
Both proponents of the response strategy and the perceptual de-
coupling perspectives may predict that participants would respond
slower to stimuli in the manual selection condition and make fewer
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errors of commission. The additional physical action of moving the
mouse cursor to ﬁrstly select the stimulus, before a click response can
then be made, should slow participants' responses. From a strategic or
motor inhibition view of SART responding, the requirement to make the
manual movement should lead to fewer commission errors simply be-
cause the motor movement required to respond takes longer, which
should give participants more time to inhibit the prepotent motor re-
sponse. From a perceptual decoupling perspective, the additional
manual movement may actually induce greater cognitive engagement
than a simple automated button press (click). Thus, advocates of the
mindlessness or perceptual decoupling perspective may claim that a
reduction in commission errors in a manual selection SART is consistent
with their perspective. However, would the need to move a bit farther
result in less mindlessness? Granted the need to manually acquire tar-
gets may induce greater engagement, but if the time of the movement is
itself critical then this suggests the need to manually select is beneﬁcial
simply because of the temporal delay. Where the two theories would
therefore oﬀer diﬀerential predictions concerns the impact of distance
on performance.
It was predicted that commission errors would be inversely related
to distance in the manual selection condition, but not in the automatic
selection condition. Stimuli at the far distance should lead to longer
movement times when participants are required to manually move their
cursor to the stimuli (see Fitts' Law; Fitts, 1954). Since longer move-
ment times should essentially mean longer RTs, participants should
make fewer commission errors, because the longer RTs will provide
them with more time to inhibit the feed-forward ballistic motor pro-
gram and thus withhold responses to No-Go stimuli more often. This is
consistent with a simple response inhibition or response strategy per-
spective of SART performance. There is no reason to expect from a
decoupling perspective that a slightly longer movement would itself
cause greater perceptual coupling to the stimuli. Regardless this method
may help resolve the role of delay in responding itself in SART per-
formance. A movement eﬀect is evidence for time-dependent action
stopping, not greater engagement.
In addition, self-reported measures of thoughts were taken. Each
participant completed two Go/No-Go response tasks and after each of
these, two self-report scales to gauge thoughts and workload. The self-
report thought and workload scales were predicted to reﬂect the ad-
ditional physical demands of the manual selection condition but yield
no diﬀerences between the mental demands of the manual versus the
automatic selection condition, in line with the response strategy per-
spective. Advocates of a mindlessness or perceptual decoupling per-
spective of the SART would more likely predict large diﬀerences in self-
reported TUTs between the manual and automatic SARTs.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Forty-one (27 female, 14 male) students from the University of
Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, participated as part of a course
laboratory class requirement. They ranged in age between 19 and
30 years (M= 21.4, SD= 1.8). All participants had normal or cor-
rected to normal vision.
2.2. Materials
Participants were tested in individual workstation cubicles, seated
50 cm in front of Phillips 225B2 LCD computer screens (1680 × 1050
pixels, 60 Hz refresh rate) which were paired with 3.40 GHz Intel i7
2600 PC computers. Stimuli presentation, response accuracy and timing
were achieved using E-prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools,
Pittsburgh, PA). Screens were mounted at eye level and participants did
not have their head movements restrained. All participants completed
two diﬀerent Go/No-Go response tasks that were modiﬁed versions of
the SART (Robertson et al., 1997). The two SARTS diﬀered in the
movement (between-task; manual versus automatic) that participants
were required to perform to make responses. For both SARTs, four
boxes (each 60 mm× 60 mm), serving as possible locations for the
stimuli, were displayed on the screen during the task and were arranged
horizontally (see Fig. 1) in the vertical center of the screen. A ﬁxation
cross (6 mm× 6 mm) was visible in the center of the screen at the
onset of each trial. A second manipulation was present within both of
the SARTs: distance (within-task; close versus far). To the immediate
left and right of the ﬁxation cross was a ‘close’ box centered 55 mm
away and a ‘far’ box centered 150 mm away. On each side the distance
between the close and the far box was 95 mm. There were 252 trials in
each SART. Go stimuli had a proportion of 0.89 and No-Go stimuli had
a proportion of 0.11. Each trial a stimulus appeared in one of the four
boxes. In the manual SART, at the onset of each stimulus the ﬁxation
cross was replaced with a cross hair (as used by Head and Helton, 2013,
2014a, 2014b), which was similar in shape to the ﬁxation cross
(6 mm× 6 mm) except larger (10 mm× 10 mm). The change to the
crosshair served as a cue for the participant, indicating that they now
had manual control over the cursor or crosshair. It should be noted that
this visual change itself could have attracted participants' attention.
However, at the same moment that the cross extended a new stimulus
was also presented, which is likely to have been the more attention-
capturing event for participants. Participants were required to manually
shift the crosshair from the central point to a box containing a stimulus
that they wished to select. Once the cursor was positioned over a box,
the box's borders became bolded (thicker), indicating that it was se-
lected. To complete the response participants were required to click the
mouse. Participants were not required to move the cursor after they had
made a response; the cursor automatically moved back to the central
point at the end of each trial. In the automatic SART, at the onset of
each stimulus participants were not required to move the mouse as the
box containing the stimulus was instead automatically selected for
them (again indicated by the borders becoming bolded). To complete a
response in this condition, participants only had to click the mouse
button. Mouse movement was disabled in the automatic condition. A
Microsoft Wheel Mouse Optical was used to move the cursor (manual
condition only) and to perform the click (both conditions).
Two self-report questionnaires were used. One was the 11 item
Stress Scale (see Blakely, 2014; de Joux, Wilson, Russell, Finkbeiner,
and Helton, 2017) where each item was based on factors from the
Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ; Matthews et al., 2002). Note
that the Stress Scale questions are diﬀerent from those found in the
DSSQ. For instance, to gain a measure of TUT in the current study,
rather than being a combination of highly speciﬁc types of TUTs, there
was just one question: “Overall, how much did you think about some-
thing other than the task?” Items were ranked on a Likert scale of 0
(“very low”) to 10 (“very high”) and included: physical fatigue, mental
fatigue, tense, unhappy, motivation, task interest, self-related thoughts,
concentration, conﬁdence, TRTs, and TUTs. The second scale was a
Fig. 1. The four possible stimuli locations and the central ﬁxation cross.
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modiﬁed version of the NASA–Task Load Index (TLX) scale (Hart and
Staveland, 1988) used to gauge subjective workload. This version was
determined via prior factor analyses (see Bailey and Thompson, 2001;
Ramiro, Valdehita, Lourdes, and Moreno, 2010) and consisted of the
following six subscales: mental demand, physical demand, temporal
demand, performance monitoring demand, eﬀort and emotional de-
mand (see Blakely, 2014; de Joux et al., 2017; Hancock, 2015; Sellers,
Helton, Näswall, Funke, and Knott, 2014). Items were ranked on the
same 0 to 10 Likert scale used for the Stress Scale. A global workload
measure, which was the combined average of the responses to the
NASA-TLX subscales, was also computed for each participant.
Stimuli were two computer-generated images of robots (see Fig. 2)
sized approximately 85 mm× 85 mm. One was an XM1219 Armed
Robotoc Vehicle and the other was a Legged Squad Support System.
These were sized to ﬁt inside the boxes and so shared the same di-
mensions as the boxes. Images were used instead of numbers in an at-
tempt to provide more realism necessary for the application of the task
to Shoot/No shoot tasks (see Wilson, Head, de Joux, Finkbneiner, &
Helton, 2015) and to encourage participant engagement (see Szalma,
Schmidt, Teo, and Hancock, 2014), although it should be noted that any
such eﬀect would likely be minor. Through random assignment, half of
participants had the XM1219 Armed Robotoc Vehicle as a Go stimulus
and the Legged Squad Support System as a No-Go stimulus (for both
SARTs), while this allocation was reversed for the other half of parti-
cipants. Participants' allocation was the same for both SARTs to avoid
any possible confusion of swapping stimuli. The order of stimulus
presentation was random, as was the location that stimuli appeared in.
For each SART, the 252 trials were divided evenly between the four
boxes/locations (63 presentations each; 126 at the close distance and
126 at the far distance). Go and No-Go trials were also divided evenly
between the locations.
The behavioural metrics of particular interest were errors of com-
mission (failures to withhold to No-Go stimuli), errors of omission
(failures to respond to Go stimuli) and RTs to Go stimuli. Cursor
movements in the manual condition were also tracked by recording the
X and Y co-ordinates of the mouse cursor every 20 ms.
2.3. Procedure
Participants were seated at individual cubicles and asked to switch
mobile phones oﬀ and to remove wrist watches. They were instructed to
respond to Go stimuli (p= 0.89) and to not respond to No-Go stimuli
(p= 0.11). Participants were told to place equal emphasis on speed and
accuracy. Before each SART participants were informed which type of
robot their Go stimulus was and which type their No-Go stimulus was.
They were then told whether the forthcoming SART required manual
movement of the mouse or not. For the manual condition, participants
were instructed to respond to Go stimuli by moving the mouse cursor or
crosshair towards and into the box that the Go stimulus appeared in and
then to click the mouse button. For the automatic condition, partici-
pants were instructed to respond to Go stimuli by simply clicking the
mouse button when Go stimuli appeared. Participants completed a
practice task before each SART consisting of 36 trials in the same
movement mode (manual or automatic) as their forthcoming SART and
containing verbal accuracy feedback.
For both SARTs, each trial began with the four empty boxes and a
ﬁxation cross, which lasted for 200 ms, at which point a stimulus then
appeared in one of the four boxes. This stimulus was visible for 250 ms.
When the stimulus disappeared the four boxes remained on the screen
for a further 1000 ms. Thus the total onset to onset interval was
1450 ms. Responses were recorded up to 1000 ms after stimulus onset.
Through random assignment, half of participants completed the
manual SART ﬁrst while the other half completed the automatic SART
ﬁrst. Participants completed the Stress Scale and the modiﬁed NASA-
TLX scale immediately after each SART. The SARTs were each 6.1 min
in duration and the whole experimental session took approximately
20 min to complete.
3. Results
3.1. SART performance
For each subject in each condition, manual and automatic (selec-
tion) and close or far (distance) we calculated the proportion of com-
mission errors, proportion of omission errors, and the mean correct Go-
stimuli RTs. These data are present in Table 1.
To explore the diﬀerences between the conditions, separate 2 (se-
lection: manual vs. automatic) × 2 (distance: close vs. far) repeated
measures ANOVAs were performed on each of the three performance
measures. These were followed up with paired t-tests when necessary,
with Holm-Bonferroni corrections (Holm, 1979) used to control the
familywise error rate. This procedure is more powerful than the Bon-
ferroni procedure yet maintains the Type I error rate (Park, Cho, and Ki,
2009).
For RTs, there was a main eﬀect of selection, wherein the manual
(M= 560.6 ms, SD= 58.2) selection condition was signiﬁcantly
slower than the automatic (M= 341.2 ms, SD= 40.5) selection con-
dition, F(1, 40) = 601.5, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.938. There was also a
main eﬀect of distance, with responses to far (M= 489.6 ms,
SD= 43.7) distance signiﬁcantly slower than close (M= 412.2 ms,
Fig. 2. The computer generated robot images used as stimuli:
XM1219 Armed Robotoc Vehicle (left; http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/XM1219_Armed_Robotic_Vehicle) and Legged Squad
Support System (right; http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legged_
Squad_Support_System).
Table 1
SART performance for each condition. Values within parantheses represent standard
deviations.
Automatic Manual
Close Far Close Far
RT (ms) 327.5 (38.3) 354.9 (43.7) 497.0 (58.3) 624.3 (61.4)
Errors of commission .39 (.22) .42 (.19) .05 (.09) .02 (.05)
Errors of omission .01 (.02) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .02 (.02)
Box entries (NA) .79 (.16) .61 (.17)
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SD= 40.2) distance, F(1, 40) = 935.5, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.959. There
was also a signiﬁcant selection x distance interaction, F(1, 40) = 494.0,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.925. This interaction was followed up with paired t-
tests for which Cohen's d was used as a measure of eﬀect size. Cohen's d
was calculated by dividing the mean diﬀerence by the standard de-
viation of the diﬀerence scores, as provided by SPSS. Paired t-tests re-
vealed that the manual-far condition had signiﬁcantly longer RTs than
manual-close, t(40) = 29.5, p < 0.001, d= 4.606, and equally, au-
tomatic-far had longer RTs than automatic-close, t(40) = 13.27,
p < 0.001, d= 2.073. RTs to the far distance were longer in both
selection modes, however a visual inspection of the results suggests that
the RT diﬀerence between close and far was much more substantial in
the manual selection mode, Mdiﬀerence = 127.2 ms, 95% CI [118.55,
135.99], than the automatic selection mode, Mdiﬀerence = 27.4 ms, 95%
CI [23.22, 31.56].
For errors of commission, there was a main eﬀect of selection, F(1,
40) = 216.3, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.844, with fewer errors made in
manual (M= 0.03, SD= 0.06) than automatic (M= 0.40, SD= 0.18).
There was no main eﬀect of distance (close M= 0.22, SD= 0.14; far
M= 0.22, SD= 0.10), F (1, 40) = 0.003, p= 0.959, η2p = 0.000,
however there was a signiﬁcant interaction between selection and
distance, F(1, 40) = 6.17, p= 0.017, η2p = 0.134. Manual-far had sig-
niﬁcantly fewer commission errors than manual-close, t(40) = 3.05,
p= 0.004, d= 0.476, but there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
automatic-far and automatic-close, t(40) = 1.20, p= 0.238,
d= 0.187. Distance did not appear to be a factor in the automatic
condition, yet in the manual condition fewer commission errors were
made at the far distance.
Errors of omission were generally low, yet there was a main eﬀect of
distance, with signiﬁcantly more omission errors made to stimuli at the
far (M= 0.011, SD= 0.01) distance than to stimuli at the close
(M= 0.006, SD= 0.01) distance, F(1,40) = 8.07, p= 0.007,
η2p = 0.168. There was no diﬀerence between omission errors for
manual (M= 0.011, SD= 0.01) versus automatic (M= 0.006,
SD= 0.02) selection modes, F(1, 40) = 2.05, p= 0.160, η2p = 0.049,
however there was a signiﬁcant interaction between distance and se-
lection, F(1, 40) = 12.30, p= 0.001, η2p = 0.235. Paired t-tests showed
that there was a diﬀerence within the manual condition, with sig-
niﬁcantly more omission errors made to far than to close, t(40) = 3.66,
p= 0.002, d= 0.572, but no diﬀerence within the automatic condi-
tion, t(40) = 0.72, p= 0.474, d= 0.113. The greater amount of
omission errors to far stimuli than close stimuli was therefore due to a
diﬀerence within the manual condition. While this could have been
simply due to participants not having enough time to move the cursor
to the farther boxes, the fact that very few responses were recorded near
to the 1000 ms time suggests that participants did in fact have suﬃcient
time to make responses in all conditions.
It was noted that errors of commission were relatively rare in the
manual selection condition (although a paired t-test showed that sig-
niﬁcantly fewer commission errors were made to far stimuli than to
close stimuli within the manual condition). To provide further insight
into how participants' ability to withhold changed over the conditions,
an additional metric was used. Using the data from cursor movements
during the manual condition, it was possible to tell whether or not the
stimuli box was entered during each trial. The X and Y coordinates of
the mouse cursor every 20 ms during the trial were examined. Through
this it was apparent that while participants in the manual condition had
successfully withheld responses to No-Go stimuli for the vast majority
of the time, they had physically moved the cursor to the box which a
No-Go stimulus had appeared in. On average, participants moved their
cursor into the stimuli's box 70% of the time. It was thought that this
could provide further insight into how participants' ability to withhold
may have been aﬀected by manual selection as well as distance. As only
the manual condition was applicable here, a paired samples t-test was
done to see how distance aﬀected “box entries.” There were sig-
niﬁcantly fewer box entries to far boxes (M= 0.61, SD= 0.17) than to
close boxes (M= 0.79, SD= 0.16), t(40) = 5.80, p < 0.001,
d= 0.905.
Density plots were created to visually depict the density of partici-
pants' mouse movements in the manual condition. The ﬁgures below
Fig. 3. Density plot depicting X and Y coordinates of all participants' mouse cursor
movements during manual-close Go trials which were scored “correct”.
Fig. 4. Density plot depicting X and Y coordinates of all participants' mouse cursor
movements during manual-far Go trials which were scored “correct”.
Fig. 5. Density plot depicting X and Y coordinates of all participants' mouse cursor
movements during manual-close No-Go trials which were scored “correct”.
Fig. 6. Density plot depicting X and Y coordinates of all participants' mouse cursor
movements during manual-far No-Go trials which were scored “correct”.
Fig. 7. Density plot depicting X and Y coordinates of all participants' mouse cursor
movements during manual-close No-Go trials which were scored “incorrect”.
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(Figs. 3–8) take into account the position of the cursor (using the re-
corded X and Y coordinates) over several of the diﬀerent trial types
while also classifying the outcome of the trial (correct or incorrect;
commission error). The two squares on each ﬁgure represent the boxes
whereas the ‘+’ represents the ﬁxation cross at the beginning of the
trial and the central point at which the cursor was positioned by de-
fault.
3.2. Subjective state
Each participant's mean subjective ratings of each item on both the
Stress Scale (Table 2) and the modiﬁed NASA-TLX (Table 3), for both
the manual and automatic selection conditions were calculated. Scores
for close versus far distance could not be analysed here given this
manipulation occurred at the within-task level rather than the between-
task level. Paired samples t-tests were conducted to see how the se-
lection manipulation aﬀected each of the subjective ratings. To calcu-
late Cohen's d, mean diﬀerences were divided by the standard deviation
of the diﬀerence scores. To control for familywise error rate the Holm-
Bonferroni procedure was used. Bayes factors were calculated in order
to better evaluate the support for and against the null and alternative
hypotheses. The JZS Bayes Factors were used as recommended by
Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson (2009). These generate the
odds for and against the null-hypothesis versus a reasonable alternative
hypothesis. The Bayes factors reﬂect the odds of support for the hy-
pothesis speciﬁed within the table. Both the non-adjusted and the ad-
justed p-values as well as the Bayes factors can be found in the tables.
Ratings of physical demand were higher for manual selection than
automatic selection, t(40) = 5.34, p < 0.001, d= 0.837, and simi-
larly, physical fatigue was higher for manual selection than automatic
selection, t(40) = 2.29, p= 0.027, d= 0.358 (although this was not
signiﬁcant when using the adjusted p-values). However, neither mental
demand, t(40) = 1.92, p= 0.063, d= 0.299, nor mental fatigue, t(40)
= 0.14, p= 0.891, d= 0.022, were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the
manual and automatic conditions. There was also no signiﬁcant dif-
ference for levels of TUTs between the manual and automatic condi-
tions, t(40) = 1.28, p= 0.209, d= 0.199. Also signiﬁcantly higher for
the manual condition than the automatic condition were ratings of
concentration, t(40) = 3.58, p= 0.001, d= 0.559, conﬁdence, t(40)
= 3.74, p= 0.001, d= 0.585, TRTs, t(40) = 2.24, p= 0.031,
d= 0.350 (however this was not signiﬁcant when considering the ad-
justed p-values), and global workload, t(40) = 2.84, p= 0.007,
d= 0.444. There were no other diﬀerences between the manual and
automatic conditions, p > 0.05.
Whether TRTs or TUTs were higher for each of the two conditions
was also investigated, as these two items aﬀord an easy and useful
comparison with each other. Paired samples t-tests revealed that for the
manual condition, TRTs were signiﬁcantly higher than TUTs, t(40)
= 4.34, p < 0.001, d= 0.678. Similarly for the automatic condition,
TRTs were signiﬁcantly higher than TUTs, t(40) = 2.47, p= 0.018,
d= 0.385.
3.3. Correlations
3.3.1. Correlations between RT and commission errors
Pearson product–moment correlation coeﬃcients were used to
analyse the relationships between RT and commission errors for each of
the conditions (N= 41 in all cases; see Table 4). There was a signiﬁcant
negative correlation between RT and commission errors in both the
automatic condition and the manual condition. Both conditions were
then broken down to investigate Distance as well. There were sig-
niﬁcant correlations indicative of speed–accuracy trade-oﬀs for every
condition except the manual-far condition.
3.3.2. Correlations between SART performance and subjective state
Correlations between SART performance measures and each of
TUTs, TRTs, and concentration were examined. For Manual selection,
neither commission errors nor RT correlated signiﬁcantly with TUTs,
TRT, or concentration, p > 0.05. For Automatic selection, commission
errors were positively correlated with TUTs, r= 0.314, p= 0.046, but
not with TRTs or concentration, p > 0.05. RTs were negatively cor-
related with TUTs, r=−0.323, p= 0.040, but were not signiﬁcantly
correlated with TRTs or concentration, p > 0.05.
Partial correlations were then conducted for Automatic selection to
control for the inﬂuence of RT. The partial correlation between com-
mission errors and TUTs when controlling for RT was r= 0.172,
p= 0.289, while the partial correlation between RT and TUTs when
controlling for commission errors was r=−0.189, p= 0.243.
Fig. 8. Density plot depicting X and Y coordinates of all participants' mouse cursor
movements during manual-far No-Go trials which were scored “incorrect”.
Table 2
Stress Scale ratings for the manual and automatic conditions.
Manual Automatic d Non-adjusted p-values Adjusted p-values Bayes factors
Physical fatigue⁎ 4.12 (2.72) 3.24 (2.70) 0.358 0.027 0.243 1.73, alt
Mental fatigue 4.95 (2.85) 5.00 (2.84) 0.022 0.891 1.00 5.84, null
Tense 3.95 (2.93) 3.93 (2.50) 0.013 0.933 1.00 5.91, null
Unhappy 2.85 (2.52) 3.41 (2.73) 0.302 0.060 0.42 1.10, null
Motivation 6.17 (2.10) 5.76 (2.35) 0.205 0.197 0.985 2.68, null
Task Interest 4.02 (2.41) 3.46 (2.63) 0.246 0.123 0.738 1.90, null
Self-related thoughts 3.20 (2.10) 3.39 (2.13) 0.088 0.574 1.00 5.10, null
Concentration⁎⁎ 7.00 (1.83) 6.17 (2.11) 0.559 0.001 0.011 33.0, alt
Conﬁdence⁎⁎ 6.71 (1.66) 5.76 (1.53) 0.585 0.001 0.011 50.0, alt
TRTs⁎ 7.00 (2.07) 6.22 (2.04) 0.350 0.031 0.248 1.57, alt
TUTs 4.20 (2.65) 4.71 (2.27) 0.199 0.209 0.985 2.78, null
Values in parentheses represent standard deviations.
alt = in favour of alternative hypothesis, null = in favour of null hypothesis.
⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
⁎ p < 0.05.
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4. Discussion
The current experiment employed a modiﬁed version of the SART to
investigate the eﬀects that, 1) changing the physical method of ac-
quiring targets and 2) manipulating target distance, had on SART per-
formance. This was done with two manipulations: Firstly, to respond to
stimuli participants were required to either make no movement except
to press the mouse button, or to make a movement to the location of the
stimulus before pressing the button. Secondly, stimuli were either lo-
cated at a close distance to a central point or farther away.
Both the perceptual decoupling explanations and a simple response
strategy explanation of SART responding predict that manual response
movement should have led to slower RTs and fewer commission errors,
which was indeed observed in the results. Where the two theories diﬀer
in terms of their predictions about the behavioural results though, are
the eﬀects of distance on performance and the likelihood of an inter-
action eﬀect between the mode of selection and distance. The response
strategy view would predict that manual selection would yield greater
commission errors when distance is shorter, but in the automatic con-
dition commission errors should be the same irrespective of the dis-
tance.
In line with a response strategy explanation, there were main eﬀects
of distance, with stimuli at the far distance yielding both slower RTs
and fewer commission errors. There were also interaction eﬀects be-
tween selection and distance. While there were longer RTs to far stimuli
than to close stimuli for both automatic and manual selection, the
diﬀerence was much more substantial within the manual condition. In
terms of commission errors, fewer errors were made to far stimuli than
to close stimuli when selection was manual, but there was no diﬀerence
between the distances when selection was automatic. Eﬀectively, target
distance had much more inﬂuence on RTs and commission errors when
selection was manual than when it was automatic.
Self-reported ratings revealed that, unsurprisingly, physical demand
and physical fatigue were higher for manual selection. The two per-
spectives on SART performance diﬀer in their predictions of mental
fatigue and demand though. From a perceptual decoupling perspective,
the condition where RTs were slower and commission errors were fewer
(manual selection) should have provided more exogenous support of
attention, thereby preventing perceptual decoupling and leading to
those observations of slower RTs and fewer commission errors. This
should be reﬂected by higher ratings of mental demand and mental
fatigue. Conversely, a response strategy perspective posits that the
diﬀerence in SART performance here could be explained by the physical
diﬀerences alone. The results revealed no diﬀerences for mental de-
mand or mental fatigue between the manual and automatic conditions,
thus we failed to ﬁnd evidence consistent with a perceptual decoupling
explanation.
Another point where the two diﬀerent perspectives diﬀer concerns
TUTs. In the manual condition, where from the perceptual decoupling
perspective there should be less mind-wandering or TUTs than in the
automatic condition, we found no evidence for much of a diﬀerence in
self-reported TUTs. The diﬀerence in TUTs between the two conditions
was according to a Bayesian analysis approximately 3 to 1 in favour of
the null hypothesis. The tasks were, however, perceived diﬀerently.
Indeed the manual task was perceived as more demanding than the
automatic task with increased reports of physical demand and when
global workload was calculated, increased global workload. The only
workload measure that numerically was higher for the automatic task
than the manual task was performance monitoring demand (though not
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent). There were also diﬀerences in self-
reports of concentration, conﬁdence, and TRTs. The two tasks do place
diﬀerent demands on the person and this is recognized by participants.
The automatic task is much more likely to result in inhibition failures
(commission errors) and these are probably noticed by participants.
Indeed in previous research, normal (non-brain-damaged) participants
report near 100% awareness of commission errors in the SART
(McAvinue et al., 2005) and there is noted post commission error re-
sponse slowing in the SART (Manly, Davison, Heutink, Galloway, and
Robertson, 2000; Robertson et al., 1997). Participants reported elevated
concentration and conﬁdence in the manual SART in comparison to the
automatic SART. This may be because they objectively perform better
in terms of commission errors in the manual SART than the automatic
SART. We suspect some researchers may have underestimated the role
that actual task performance may have on self-reports given during or
after the task (see Head and Helton, 2016). If performance is perceived
to be relatively good, then participants may report improved conﬁdence
and concentration, even if they are not preoccupied by more TUTs to
any substantial degree. However, there is also the possibility that self-
reports of TUTs are also contaminated by performance awareness and
appraisal.
The perceptual decoupling account of the SART, whose proponents
suggest errors of commission in the SART are due to a lack of external
awareness caused by preoccupation with TUTs, would also suggest
strong correlations between TUTs and commission errors. As a spee-
d–accuracy trade-oﬀ is a known factor in the SART, some researchers
promoting this perspective have advocated controlling for the SATO by
factoring out response speed (i.e., response time) statistically from the
relationship between TUTs and errors of commission (Seli, Jonker,
Solman, Cheyne, and Smilek, 2013). This statistical solution only con-
trols for static between-subjects diﬀerences of the SATO. Some
Table 3
NASA-TLX ratings for the manual and automatic conditions.
Manual Automatic d Non-adjusted p-values Adjusted p-values Bayes factors
Physical demand⁎⁎ 3.39 (2.01) 1.71 (1.68) 0.833 < 0.001 0.007 4929, alt
Mental demand 5.83 (2.26) 5.39 (2.31) 0.299 0.063 0.315 1.13, null
Temporal demand 5.66 (2.15) 5.51 (2.10) 0.077 0.625 1.00 5.29, null
Eﬀort 5.80 (2.33) 5.59 (2.28) 0.102 0.517 1.00 4.85, null
Emotional demand 2.66 (1.87) 2.59 (2.11) 0.038 0.808 1.00 5.76, null
Performance monitoring demand 5.48 (2.20) 5.72 (2.16) 0.161 0.313 1.00 3.65, null
Global Workload⁎⁎ 4.79 (1.53) 4.40 (1.54) 0.444 0.007 0.042 5.45, alt
Values in parentheses represent standard deviations.
alt = in favour of alternative hypothesis, null = in favour of null hypothesis.
⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
Table 4
Correlations (r) between RT and errors of commission for each condition.
Manual Automatic
−0.371⁎ −0.552⁎⁎
Manual-Close Manual-Far Auto-Close Auto-Far
−0.42⁎⁎ −0.09 −0.50⁎⁎ −0.48⁎⁎
⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
⁎ p < 0.05.
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individuals tend to react hastily and thus, tend to be commission error
prone; whereas others tend to react slowly and thus are less commission
error prone. This, however, neglects the real insight of Peebles and
Bothell's (2004) ACT-R model in which the SATO is a process that oc-
curs within an individual as they experience the SART. The participant
is trying to balance the competing demands of the SART: to respond as
quickly and accurately as they can which are incompatible demands. As
most of the stimuli in the SART are Go stimuli, responding more quickly
is usually rewarded as the participant will often encounter runs of Go
stimuli. Only when a relatively rare No-Go stimuli is encountered does
the quick response strategy fail and since this is noticed by the parti-
cipant there is an immediate shift in response strategy to encourage
increased caution. This is well noted in the SART as post commission
error responses are typically slow and RTs preceding commission errors
are relatively fast (e.g., Manly et al., 2000). The SATO, in addition to
varying between individuals, also varies dynamically within in-
dividuals. Thus, between-subjects analyses do not entirely eliminate the
SATO. Despite the apparent confusion of a between-subjects and a
within-subjects SATO processes in the literature, we nevertheless have
reported the correlations (partial) between TUTs and commission errors
controlling for RT.
Even in the case of automatic selection the correlation between
TUTs and commission errors when RT is partialed out is r= 0.172
(statistically non-signiﬁcant). In other words when the between subjects
SATO is statistically controlled there is approximately 3% shared var-
iance between TUTs and commission errors. While this may provide
some marginal support for the mind-wandering and perceptual decou-
pling perspective of commission errors, we advocate continued skepti-
cism regarding this interpretation. This partial correlation means 97%
of the variance in errors of commission is not shared with TUTs. In
addition, the slight shared variance could be due to two alternative
possibilities instead of the interpretation that TUTs are a cause for er-
rors of commission. First, individuals who tend to report TUTs or are
TUT prone, may also have a tendency to have poor motor inhibition.
Indeed, Kane and colleagues (McVay and Kane, 2009) have suggested
and have provided some evidence that TUTs are a consequence of ex-
ecutive control failures not necessarily causes for control failures.
Second, normal individuals report being nearly 100% aware of com-
mission errors in the SART (McAvinue et al., 2005). This suggests
awareness of commission errors may instead contaminate TUT self-re-
ports. If a person realizes they are making errors in the SART it may be
natural to assume the reason for those errors is that the person was not
paying attention enough to the task (Head and Helton, 2016). Thus,
errors of commission may be a cause for TUTs, not the other way round.
Nevertheless, we think it may be questionable to make too much of
these post-hoc self-reports and weak, possibly spurious, associations
with commission errors.
The signiﬁcant negative correlations between RTs and commission
errors (speed–accuracy trade-oﬀ) for both of the automatic selection
conditions are consistent with typical SART ﬁndings (Helton et al.,
2005; Helton et al., 2009; Wilson, Russell, et al., 2015). Unexpectedly,
one of the manual selection conditions (manual-close) also demon-
strated a speed–accuracy trade-oﬀ. It could be that the close boxes were
close enough that the response movement they required was still rela-
tively easy to perform quickly. This could have encouraged the devel-
opment of a motor program (see Keele, 1968) within the manual-close
condition too, leading to diﬃculty withholding responses to No-Go
stimuli. A visual examination of the density plots depicting mouse
cursor movements supports this, showing that on No-Go trials (even
those scored 'correct') participants frequently moved the mouse into the
close boxes (Fig. 5) but more often refrained from moving the mouse
into the far boxes (Fig. 6). Head and Helton (2013) also observed this
and a similar explanation to what they gave is oﬀered here, in that
participants are likely to have become skilled enough at making re-
sponses to close boxes in the manual condition, that they were sus-
ceptible to speed-induced errors, just as they were in the automatic
selection condition (though to a much lesser degree). The manual-far
trials, where stimuli were in far boxes within the manual condition, as
predicted, did not lead to a speed–accuracy trade-oﬀ. These trials also
yielded the slowest RTs and, as expected, had the lowest rate of com-
mission errors. Conversely, the condition with the strongest correlation
was automatic-close which had the shortest RTs and the highest errors
of commission rate. It appears that as RTs shorten, the association be-
tween RTs and commission errors becomes stronger.
The ﬁnding that the far distance reduced commission errors, but
that importantly this was only during the manual condition and not the
automatic condition, suggests that the RT delay gave participants more
time to inhibit a prepotent motor response routine and thereby stop
themselves from making commission errors more often. The longer
distance may have only led to a 3% decrease in commission errors, but
this was a drop from 5% (close) to 2% (far); in other words, this ma-
nipulation more than halved commission errors. This contrasts with a
perceptual decoupling perspective, wherein the reduction in commis-
sion errors would be explained by the manual response re-engaging
participants, or preventing them from becoming perceptually disen-
gaged in the ﬁrst place. It appears that this perspective cannot account
for the diﬀerence in SART performance that the small change in dis-
tance yielded however. Further supporting the idea that the increased
distance gave participants more time to inhibit prepotent motor re-
sponses is the ﬁnding that, within the manual condition, despite par-
ticipants making relatively few commission errors overall, their mouse
cursor movement patterns suggest that they frequently almost made
errors of commission. That is, on approximately 70% (77% for Close
boxes; 61% for Far boxes) of No-Go trials in the manual condition,
participants actually physically moved the cursor into a box containing
a No-Go stimulus, which can clearly be seen in the density plots.
However, most of the time participants were able to prevent themselves
from carrying out the ﬁnal step to making a response—clicking the
mouse. This indicates that the prepotent motor response routine de-
veloped not only in the automatic condition but the manual condition
too, however in the manual condition it was manageable, e.g. it often
did not lead to commission errors. This reduction in commission errors
found in the manual condition is consistent with ﬁndings elsewhere
(Head and Helton, 2013, 2014a, 2014b).
The subjective reports, when considered alongside the SART per-
formance results, provide further support for a response strategy ex-
planation of SART performance as opposed to a perceptual decoupling
explanation. The reports suggest that the improved performance in the
manual condition was a result of physical or motor factors, as opposed
to mental or perceptual factors. The lack of any observed diﬀerence in
TUTs between the two diﬀerent methods of selection further implies
that the much higher commission error rate for automatic selection was
not due to participants disengaging their attention to the task per se.
One limitation of the subjective measures employed however was that
we were only able to examine the eﬀect that selection had and were
unable to parse out the eﬀect that distance itself had, because selection
varied from condition to condition (between tasks) whereas distance
varied from trial to trial (within task).
While there may be some involvement of sustained attention in the
SART, this is likely an internally directed as opposed to an externally
directed form of attention, such as perceptual awareness (Helton et al.,
2009; Helton, Weil, Middlemiss, and Sawers, 2010). SART performance
appears to be associated with executive control of the prepotent motor
response routine. This is diﬀerent to the type of sustained attention that
the majority of authors using the SART intend to measure.
The ﬁnding within the manual selection condition, that more
omission errors were made to Go stimuli in the far-distance boxes than
to close-distance boxes, could have been due to participants not having
enough time to move their mouse cursor and make their response on
some trials. However, the way in which response times were distributed
suggested that participants had suﬃcient time to make responses in this
condition. Perhaps this ﬁnding is due to participants taking tactical rest
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breaks in response to task demands. Indeed, this condition was likely
the most demanding and ratings of global workload and physical de-
mand were higher for manual selection. Increased omission errors due
to participants taking tactical rest stops has been proposed in previous
research with the SART (Finkbeiner et al., 2015; Helton et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, overall omission errors were very low (between 0 and
2%) and so this result should be treated with caution.
The current experiment may also have important implications for
some applied contexts, such as modern warfare. The possible relation of
the SART and response inhibition errors to the use of ﬁrearms has al-
ready been demonstrated; in this case with a military simulation using
human actors representing dismounted soldiers (see Wilson, Head,
et al., 2015). Furthermore, Helton and Kemp (2011) suggest that the
fast, easy and short-distance hand movements that some unmanned
vehicle weaponry systems oﬀer could make operators more vulnerable
to committing friendly ﬁre errors. New technology is driving the de-
velopment of increasingly automated weapons systems. Some of these
systems, such as the Korean-made “Super aEgis II” sentry gun, are able
to identify and lock on to targets without any involvement from a
human operator (Egeland, 2014). This removes the need for a human
operator to both detect the target and then aim at the target by phy-
sically moving the weapon towards it. Instead the operator may only be
required to pull a trigger, or push a button, to deploy the weapon. An
operator could essentially be faced with a stream of potential targets
appearing on a screen, for which they will be encouraged to make rapid
shoot/no-shoot decisions about, despite perhaps having limited or in-
complete knowledge about the targets given the short timeframe. The
nature of a task such as this has clear similarities with the SARTs used in
the current experiment. The current ﬁndings suggest that as weapons
systems become more automated, the chances of accidental shootings
(e.g. friendly ﬁre) will increase. Indeed, in the current experiment,
changing only the selection of stimuli from manual to automatic ele-
vated commission errors (accidental responding) from 3% to 40%.
While the nature of the SART (a high Go, low No-Go task with a high
rate of stimuli presentation) contributes to the high commission error
rate seen in the current experiment and other SART research too, it still
seems likely that the risk of accidental shooting could become worry-
ingly high in real-life situations, particularly as operators may en-
counter high rates of potential targets within short periods of time (e.g.,
like the SART).
In terms of future research, if a paradigm similar to the one em-
ployed here is used it may be useful to look at the eﬀect that distance
itself has on subjective thought measures, something which we were
unable to do here. One possibility would be to examine responses to far
targets versus close targets over separate tasks, to enable post-task
measurement of subjective thoughts for each distance.
In the current experiment, implementing a manual response selec-
tion condition led to slower RTs, fewer commission errors, and weaker
speed–accuracy trade-oﬀs. Furthermore, manipulating this manual re-
sponse by increasing the distance participants had to move with their
mouse cursor notably exaggerated these eﬀects. However, this was not
seen in the automatic selection condition when distance was manipu-
lated. Subjective self-reports suggested that the performance diﬀerence
between manual and automatic selection was not due to any diﬀerences
in mental demand or fatigue, but may instead be due to physical fac-
tors. Collectively, these ﬁndings support a response strategy perspective
of SART performance, as opposed to a perceptual decoupling perspec-
tive. The ﬁndings also suggest that in real-world tasks or situations
where failures of response inhibition (e.g. commission errors) may
occur, if an operator's or user's responding can be slowed down, they
will be better able to prevent these failures from occurring. Introducing
an artiﬁcial delay appears to provide a degree of protection against
commission errors.
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